



**MINSK DIALOGUE
VIRTUAL FORUM - 2020
THE BELARUS CRISIS:
MAPPING UNCERTAINTY
IN REGIONAL SECURITY**

NON-PAPER

THE BELARUS CRISIS: MAPPING UNCERTAINTY IN REGIONAL SECURITY

The year 2020 has shaken the world. The COVID-19 pandemic has brought tremendous shocks to all parts of the globe and has disrupted international relations on a scale unprecedented since World War II. Besides the direct damage that the pandemic has caused to global health and the economy, it has aggravated various pre-existing national and international problems and accelerated transformational processes in the international system. As a result, the whole world has plunged into great uncertainty.

Belarus is one of many examples of the pandemic's disruptive effects at a national level. While only a while ago it appeared one of the most politically stable countries in Eastern Europe, today Belarus finds itself amidst a dramatic political crisis. Although its causes are multifold, the state's and society's reaction to the pandemic became a decisive catalyst. Without a doubt, the Belarus crisis will have serious implications not only for the country's internal development and foreign relations but also for regional security. In recent years, Minsk has played a constructive regional role by offering itself as a neutral venue for peace talks and promoting security initiatives, which aimed at de-escalating military and political tensions between the East and the West. If Belarus is no longer able to perform such a role, regional actors should brace themselves for even more uncertainty already in the months to come.

Under these exceptional circumstances, the Minsk Dialogue Virtual Forum-2020 offered a geopolitically unbiased platform where some of the brightest minds from the international expert community engaged in a frank discussion about the multiple crises unfolding in front of our eyes and their implications for regional security. This non-paper reflects key points made by the speakers throughout the three days of the Forum. As most sessions were held under the Chatham House Rule, no references are made to the individual sources of each point.

1. According to the [Minsk Dialogue Forum Paper, which was presented at the beginning of the virtual event](#), the overall situation in regional security in Eastern Europe has deteriorated since the Minsk Dialogue Forum-2019. In spite of widely held expectations that the pandemic would help to ease regional tensions, the actual effect has been the opposite in many respects.

THE WORLD HANDCOV'D: MAJOR STATE ACTORS AND STAKEHOLDERS IN EAST EUROPEAN SECURITY

2. The COVID-19 pandemic did not become a game-changer for major state actors and multilateral institutions, but rather a catalyst of pre-existing trends. However, some COVID-19-specific developments did take place in the security realm. All states faced an economic downfall and the need to redistribute resources to support their healthcare systems. Some states, such as Germany and France, actively engaged armed forces in their national responses to the pandemic. And although the pandemic has generally had a negative effect on the capabilities and readiness of European armies in terms of hard security, it has improved the public perception of the army in many countries. At the EU level, the pandemic underlined the lack of a collective response to the global crisis and brought out the national egoism of European states.

3. The EU member states' ambition to increase defence spending, as well as to advance the concept of European strategic autonomy, is still on the agenda, regardless of the negative consequences of the pandemic or the fact that Donald Trump has lost the White House. Moreover, there is growing understanding in European decision-making circles that the EU should be ready for a longer-term challenge of manoeuvring amid expanding US-China strategic rivalry.

4. The victory of the Democrat in the US presidential elections does not automatically mean that the US, led by Joe Biden, will immediately focus on its foreign policy, as the current domestic epidemiological and social situation requires primary attention from the incoming administration. Yet, the Biden team can be expected to start increasing pressure on Russia before too long, which might lead to particularly high tensions between Washington and Moscow around 2024 – that is, the expected period of a political transition in Russia. A more assertive US foreign policy and its revitalised cooperation with the transatlantic allies might also contribute further to the rivalrous trajectory in US-China relations. In order to ensure long-term strategic stability, the US will have to find an equilibrium in its confrontations with both China and Russia.

5. Russia remains determined to sustain itself as a great power and preserve strategic autonomy in the face of growing US-China rivalry. In particular, it strives to preserve pre-eminence in the post-Soviet space. In the past couple of months Russia had to face three crises in the post-Soviet space: the unrest in Kyrgyzstan, the Belarus crisis and the armed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The Kyrgyz crisis was duly resolved not without Russian assistance; the more dangerous conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh was also settled with Moscow's active mediation and with

Russian peacekeepers having been deployed on the ground. The crisis in Belarus appears as the most challenging one for Moscow due to Belarus's strategic importance and the presence of strong Western interests. Yet, Moscow seems to hold the keys to the resolution of the crisis, while the West does not have enough leverage at the moment.

6. China, the first state to have faced the pandemic, now seems to have taken the epidemiological situation and its economic consequences under control. It is now clear that many of the initial *ad hoc* security measures, such as the state's emergency control of personal data, will be preserved permanently. Another policy that the Chinese government will keep after the pandemic is the expansion of domestic consumption, the intensification of trade and investment and the relocation of industrial chains. Given these ongoing shifts, Eastern Europe is gaining importance in China's eyes as a potentially more important economic link with Europe amid growing Sino-American strategic rivalry.

THE WORLD HANDCOV'D: MAJOR MULTILATERAL ACTORS AND STAKEHOLDERS IN EAST EUROPEAN SECURITY

7. Amid the pandemic, international multilateral institutions have faced an attack on multilateralism, and, accordingly, their effectiveness. This has been especially the case with the UN, and the World Health Organisation in particular, as their operations have been significantly politicised.

8. The OSCE has not and could not take the lead in the international response to the pandemic as it does not possess relevant expertise and the region of its mandate is really fragmented. Due to the COVID-19, the OSCE has been burdened by additional precautionary measures, which have deprived the organisation of the most important component of diplomacy – informal talks. Moreover, special monitoring missions and access to conflict zones have been disrupted. All this has coincided with a political crisis at the OSCE, which resulted in the organisation's failure to elect its new leadership in the summer of 2020. The political crisis has also demonstrated that US-Russia relations are the key variable determining the efficiency and effectiveness of the OSCE, but not the only one.

On the other hand, the OSCE has ensured its basic functioning throughout the pandemic and some of its operations continue effectively. In particular, overall cooperation between militaries in terms of information exchange goes on.

9. Yet, for nearly all international organisations the pandemic highlighted pre-existing political problems, such as insufficient funding, the loss of credibility and practical response, the politicisation of arms control initiatives, lack of cooperation, and persisting geopolitical tensions. It is yet another indication that multilateralism and international cooperation are facing fundamental challenges and need to be supported by state actors.

THE BELARUS CRISIS: IMPLICATIONS FOR BELARUS-RUSSIA RELATIONS

10. Two concepts normally dominate in discussions about Belarus-Russia relations – multi-vector foreign policy and integration. Both often get misunderstood in the media and even expert circles, which has been particularly noticeable in the context of the Belarusian political crisis.

For example, Minsk sees a multi-vector foreign policy as an objective need dictated by its geostrategic place in the borderlands between Europe and Eurasia, which is driven primarily by the logic of economic diversification. Thus, in essence, Belarusian decision-makers and experts perceive the multi-vector concept as a natural survivalist strategy for a small sovereign state that sits in geopolitical borderlands and at economic crossroads. According to their view, the multi-vector policy does not contradict in any way Belarus's strategic alliance with Russia, as it does not prevent Minsk from delivering on all of its alliance commitments. Moreover, public opinion polls show that the Belarusian population at large shares this view. However, many in Russia tend to interpret the concept of multi-vector foreign policy in geopolitical terms, which makes it problematic for Moscow. Interestingly, it is often the very phrase «multi-vector foreign policy», rather than the actual foreign policy of Belarus, that causes criticism in Russian expert circles.

The concept of integration, on the other hand, is sometimes seen negatively by Belarusian experts and commentators. This seems to result from two factors. *First*, the ideas of sovereignty and statehood form the basis of the Belarusian national identity. Hence, decision-makers and the public alike are sensitive to any possible infringements on the country's sovereignty that integration processes might lead to. *Second*, the pace of the bilateral and multilateral integration with Russia in recent years has been too high and not accompanied by a proper public discussion. Moreover, sometimes integration talks are held behind closed doors and even some officials, as well as businesses and leading experts, are held in the unknown about their results.

11. As a result, Belarus-Russia relations tend to be too emotional at times, which often generates additional negative connotations and complicates mutually beneficial progress. It should, thus, be the experts' task to lower the emotional level and promote high-quality expertise on the bilateral relations, as well as a better understanding of each country's priorities. Russian and Belarusian officials, on their part, need to find a way of better informing the general public about the intended goals and outcomes of their regular talks, as well as about difficulties on the way to achieving compromises. It is even more important given that both countries are not static systems but are rather going through dynamic transformations, which requires more transparency in decision-making with a view to avoiding major mistakes.

12. The private sector would particularly benefit from more openness in the bilateral relationship. Unlike what was the case two decades ago, private businesses are now becoming increasingly central to Belarus's economic performance (*e.g.* the private sector generates nearly 60% of the Belarusian GDP and foreign currency inflows, as well as almost 50% of jobs). Therefore, the private sector could become a new pillar of Belarus-Russia relations if it were better involved in preparing and discussing integration proposals.

THE BELARUS CRISIS: IMPLICATIONS FOR BELARUS-WEST RELATIONS

13. The Belarus crisis is in many respects a tragedy for Belarus-West relations as it inevitably implies strategic losses for all, in contrast to the win-win developments prior to August 2020. Before the presidential elections numerous joint projects were being implemented, financial support and investment flows were on the rise, high-level visits were taking place, and, most importantly, the political dialogue was progressing, albeit rather slowly.

Now the political dialogue between Belarus and the EU has been put on hold and only technical consultations remain possible. At multilateral forums, contacts at the level of deputy ministers only will be allowed, whereas the EU has launched the full review of its Belarus policy. Essentially, relations have rolled back to the level of 2006.

14. The West's immediate response to the Belarus crisis was quite paradoxical. On the one hand, the EU and especially the US introduced the weakest sanctions package possible. That can be partly explained by the bigger geopolitical/strategic role of Belarus in the West's eyes after the 2014 crisis in Ukraine. On the other hand, Western capitals took an unprecedentedly harsh rhetorical stance by not recognising Alexander Lukashenko as a

legitimate president of Belarus. What that non-recognition means in practice remains to be seen: in particular, will Western ambassadors still present their credentials to Lukashenko or not?

15. At the same time, in the eyes of the Belarusian authorities, the West has positioned itself as a hostile power as it has chosen a «side» in the internal conflict. For Minsk, this is further confirmed by the numerous meetings of top Western politicians with the opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the technical coordination of the protests from the territory of Poland (NEXTA), refusal to purchase energy from the Astravets nuclear power plant, etc. Therefore, any suggestion of a Western-facilitated/mediated internal political dialogue automatically became unacceptable for the Lukashenko government and is seen as a hidden attempt to interfere in internal affairs.

16. Meanwhile, the West does not have much leverage over the situation in Belarus. Both in Washington and Brussels there is a policy paralysis: everyone follows the situation, but no one has a clear vision for what realistically could be done. The main Western instrument of coercion – sanctions – are unlikely to bring about a change of behaviour on the part of the Belarusian authorities, as this is a regime fighting for its own survival. On top of that, Western sanctions will only make Minsk more dependent on Russia and will strengthen Moscow's leverage in Belarus.

Nonetheless, the EU is set to continue expanding sanctions. Their first round was rather nominal and intended to signal the overall disapproval of Minsk's behaviour. The second round targeted more officials and froze their assets. The third round will also include business entities. A potential fourth round is being discussed, which might imply sectoral sanctions. If they are introduced the country's economy will be hit hard.

17. The Belarusian economy is already quite fragile due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which has seriously affected both Belarus and its main trade partner Russia. Following the outbreak of the political crisis, Belarus has already witnessed the withdrawal of some assets from banks and a wave of emigration.

Economic cooperation with the West remains important, even though not critically enough to give the West a powerful lever to influence Minsk. Economically, relations with the EU matter the most in terms of Belarusian exports (roughly 30% of all Belarus's exports go to the EU), especially petrochemicals. Also, Belarus will suffer significant losses due to the termination of cooperation with Western financial institutions (the IMF, World Bank, EBRD, and EIB).

18. Even though the Biden administration in the US will be focused primarily on domestic issues, the State Department will follow further developments in Belarus closely. Sending

the US ambassador to Belarus will enhance American presence on the ground, as the ambassador will be able to reach out to both the authorities and civil society.

19. Minsk generally seems to be interested in resuming relations with the West, yet not at the expense of concessions on internal matters. For the West, Belarus remains important in the realms of security, energy, transportation and connectivity, and economy. Thus, current developments notwithstanding, all sides would do well to undertake a more strategic and longer-term approach to Belarus-West relations. All sorts of dialogue formats could be employed to that end, including Track-2/Track-1.5 meetings.

THE BELARUS CRISIS: IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY IN EASTERN EUROPE

20. At least for now, the Belarus crisis appears not to have a sizable geopolitical component, as both the incumbent government and the protesters seem to be committed to close allied relations with Russia and are also interested in preserving, at least in a longer-term perspective, a productive relationship with the West. However, given the sensitive nature of regional geopolitics in Eastern Europe, the continuation of the domestic political crisis in Belarus might quickly result in another escalation of regional tensions, even though neither Russia nor the EU wants it.

21. The current political crisis in Belarus has both new and already familiar elements to it in terms of its regional ramifications. After most previous presidential elections in Belarus (with the exception of 2015) we already saw numerous rounds of Western sanctions and Belarusian countersanctions spiral to near ruptures in Belarus-West relations, whereas Moscow would always offer its political and economic support (even though with conditions attached). Several years later, Minsk and Western capitals would normally start looking for ways to normalise their relations.

Whether the same dynamic can play out this time will depend on how exactly the new elements to the crisis will manifest themselves. *Firstly*, the fact that the domestic crisis in Belarus is unprecedented in scale and potential to last. *Secondly*, the fact that the international system today, unlike during all previous presidential elections in Belarus, is going through a structural transformation and, thus, heightened uncertainty. A destabilised Belarus poses a serious regional risk under such international conditions.

22. Security in the region has already deteriorated significantly after the outbreak of the crisis, as an open dialogue on regional security has become almost impossible. The Belarus crisis is having broad negative implications for different realms of security, even

though it will in all probability not change the overall geopolitical situation in Eastern Europe.

23. The game-changing effect of the Belarus crisis will likely be felt the most by Ukraine. After 2014, Belarus played a stabilising role in the region and served as a buffer state for Ukraine, providing security guarantees. If Minsk is no longer able to do so, Kyiv will face additional security threats and economic challenges, as Belarus has been among its top-5 trade partners.

24. Also, the domestic conflict in Belarus can further aggravate NATO-Russia tensions in Eastern Europe, as Moscow and Western capitals largely support the opposite sides of the conflict. Under these circumstances, even though neither Russia nor NATO appear interested in a large-scale confrontation over Belarus, the situation can easily get out of control.

25. Thus, there is a clear need to undertake immediate stabilising steps, such as sustaining open channels of diplomatic and military-to-military communication (bilateral and in the CSTO-NATO format), as well as enforcing regional confidence-building measures. The potential of Belarus's bilateral agreements on regional CSBMs with Ukraine, Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania should not be wasted either. While internal Belarusian actors should play the central role in determining the future of their country, both the West and Russia have to engage responsibly on the ground.

THE BELARUS CRISIS: IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY IN WIDER EURASIA

26. The crisis in Belarus is now sometimes referred to as a second part of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Many previously accepted concepts and ideas are being questioned by the Belarusian society. Yet, questions regarding state models and their effectiveness are posed in nearly every post-Soviet state. In that respect, the Belarus crisis is just a part of a broader transformation process in Wider Eurasia.

27. Such crises, which is also the case with the pandemic, tend to highlight and build on pre-existing problems. Meanwhile, regional organisations did not manage to prove their effectiveness in dealing with such crises, but rather also emphasised the prevailing character of national egoism.

28. In the post-Soviet space, people continue to resort to street protests as a primary means of political mobilisation. This and the overall Soviet legacy pre-determine multiple similarities between conflicts in otherwise very different countries.

29. The course of the Belarus crisis points to several important lessons for governments and societies across Eurasia. In particular, it highlights the critical significance of cyber and information security; the value of high-quality political analysis for all stakeholders, in contrast to partisan and self-deceiving «preaching»; and the importance of investing in dialogues with political opponents before it is too late.

30. In light of multiple imbalances in the post-Soviet space, the role and potential of regional organisations are naturally in decline. One example of that is the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, which is unlikely to enhance its standing and effectiveness in the years to come.

EASTERN EUROPE IN 2021: STRATEGIC STABILITY AND CHALLENGES FOR REGIONAL SECURITY

31. Discussions about strategic stability should rather be held under the title of «strategic instability», as there is indeed little strategic stability to be found in Eastern Europe today. The Belarus crisis seems to fit exactly into this framework.

32. Overall, stability in Eastern Europe is largely influenced by continuing tensions in NATO-Russia relations, which needs to be managed properly. If a political dialogue is not yet possible, a pragmatic approach with all due transparency and predictability should guide the process. Importantly, Belarus should not become a matter of confrontation between the West and Russia and a Ukraine-type scenario needs to be avoided at all costs. For that, the sides should be willing to undertake an honest assessment of the facts on the ground.

A NATO-Russia dialogue on transparency and confidence-building should start on the military-to-military level and turn into a routine, after that it will become possible to move on to a government-to-government dialogue format. The dialogue and rebuilding of trust shall start from cooperation in small areas and unilateral gestures of goodwill.

33. While the COVID-19 pandemic has forced governments to be more focused on internal crises, rather than geopolitical issues, it opens a window of opportunity to promote new policies in inter-state relations. COVID-19 has also highlighted the rise of

people's power, activism and resilience – it is particularly strong in countries where state institutions lack popular trust.

34. The pandemic has also escalated some conflicts in the region and will probably bring out more of them. The resolution of the crises should not end up in a zero-sum fashion if lasting solutions are to be found. Moreover, it is better to leave the perception of the world as broken down into spheres of influence, which could facilitate deeper political solutions (it is also applicable for Belarus). Additionally, it is essential that trust in and the effectiveness of national and international institutions be restored.

35. The definition of security has to be expanded, especially in the context of the pandemic and climate change.

ATTACHMENT

Minsk Dialogue Virtual Forum
The Belarus Crisis:
Mapping the uncertainty in regional security
25-27 November 2020

Agenda

25 November (Wednesday)

16.00-16.20

Welcome remarks

Yauheni Preiherman

Director, Minsk Dialogue Council on International Relations, Belarus

Jakob Wöllenstein

Director Country Office Belarus, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Germany

16.20-16.30

Presentation of the Forum report

In partnership with PACT

Dzianis Melyantsou

Programme Coordinator, Minsk Dialogue Council on International Relations, Belarus

Siarhei Bohdan

*Fellow, Friedrich Meinecke Institute of History, Freie Universität Berlin;
Expert Council member, Minsk Dialogue Council on International Relations, Germany-Belarus*

16.30-18.00

Session 1. The World HandCOV'd: Major state actors and stakeholders in East European security

In partnership with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung

Thomas Graham

Distinguished Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations; Senior Advisor, Kissinger Associates, USA

Nadezhda Arbatova

Head, Department for European Political Studies, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia

Amelie Stelzner

Policy Advisor for Armed Forces and Society, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Germany

Zhang Xin

Associate Professor, School of Advanced International and Area Studies; Deputy Director, Centre for Russian Studies, East China Normal University, China

Paul Révay

Member of the Board of Trustees, «Friends of Europe» (Belgium), France

Zachary Paikin

Senior Visiting Fellow, Global Policy Institute (London); Senior editor, Global Brief Magazine, Canada

Moderator

Jakob Wöllenstein

Director Country Office Belarus, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Germany

18.15-19.45

Session 2. The World HandCOV'd: Major multilateral actors and stakeholders in East European security

In partnership with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung

Andrey Zagorskiy

Head of Department of Arms Control and Conflict Resolution Studies, Institute of World Economy and International Relations; Professor, MGIMO-University, Russia

Mona Ali Khalil

Director, MAK LAW INTERNATIONAL; Affiliate of the Harvard Law School Programme on International Law and Armed Conflict; former UN Senior Legal Officer

Wolfgang Richter

Senior Associate, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Germany

Samuel Charap

Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation, USA

Benno Zogg

Senior Researcher, Centre for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, Switzerland

Moderator

Yulia Nikitina

Associate Professor and Research Fellow, Centre for the Post-Soviet Studies at the Moscow State University of International Relations (MGIMO), Russia

26 November (Thursday)

15.45-15.55 **Presentation. Geopolitical orientations in Belarusian public opinion.**

Andrey Vardamatsky

Sociologist, Belarus

16.00-17.30 **Session 3. Belarus Crisis: Implications for Belarus-Russia relations**

In partnership with the MGIMO Institute for International Studies

Aleh Makarau

Director, Belarusian Institute for Strategic Research, Belarus

Elena Kuzmina

Head, Section for Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russia

Sergey Markedonov

Leading Researcher, Euro-Atlantic Security Centre, Institute of International Studies at MGIMO University; Editor-in-Chief, Journal of International Analytics, Russia

Pavel Daneiko

CEO, IPM Business School, Belarus

Igor Okunev

Director, Centre for Spatial Analysis in International Relations, MGIMO University, Russia

Moderator

Andrey Sushentsov

Director, Institute of International Studies at MGIMO University; Programme Director, Valdai Discussion Club, Russia

17.45-19.15

Session 4. Belarus Crisis: Implications for Belarus-West relations

In partnership with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

Eugene Rumer

Director and Senior Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, USA

Elena Korosteleva

Professor of International Politics, Director of the Global Europe Centre, University of Kent, UK

Kateryna Bornukova

Academic Director, BEROE Economic Research Centre, Belarus

Andris Spruds

Director, Latvian Institute of International Affairs, Latvia

Dzianis Melyantsou

Programme Coordinator, Minsk Dialogue Council on International Relations, Belarus

Moderator

Valeriya Klymenko

Programme Coordinator, FES Belarus, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

27 November (Friday)

15.00-16.15

Session 5. Belarus Crisis: Implications for regional security in Eastern Europe

Vygaudas Ušackas

Member of the Board, Avia Solutions Group; former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania; former EU Ambassador to Russia, Lithuania

Andrey Sushentsov

Director, Institute of International Studies at MGIMO University; Programme Director, Valdai Discussion Club, Russia

Anna Maria Dyer

Analyst, Polish Institute for International Affairs (PISM), Poland

Hanna Shelest

Editor-in-Chief, UA: Ukraine Analytica, Ukraine

Yauheni Preiherman

Founder and Director, Minsk Dialogue Council on International Relations, Belarus

Moderator

Jakob Wöllenstein

*Director Country Office Belarus, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung,
Germany*

16.15-17.30

**Session 6. Belarus Crisis: Implications for regional security
in Wider Eurasia**

In partnership with the GCFR COMPASS project

Viktar Shadurski

*Dean, Faculty of International Relations, Belarusian State
University, Belarus*

Anar Valiyev

*Dean, School of Public and International Affairs, ADA University,
Azerbaijan*

Cholpon Turdalieva

Professor, American University of Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan

Montu Saxena

*Director, Cambridge Central Asia Forum, University of
Cambridge, UK*

Farrukh Salimov

*Head, Department of Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, Tajik
National University, Tajikistan*

Ulugbeck Khasanov

*Chair, International Relations Department, University of World
Economics and Diplomacy, Uzbekistan*

Moderator

Elena Korosteleva

*Professor of International Politics, Director of the Global Europe
Centre, University of Kent, UK*

17.45-19.15

Session 7. Eastern Europe in 2021: *Strategic stability and challenges for regional security*

In partnership with the European Leadership Network

Stefano Stefanini

Former Permanent Representative of Italy to NATO; former Diplomatic Advisor to the President of Italy; ELN Executive Board member, Italy

Philip Breedlove

Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, USA

Oksana Antonenko

Director, Global Risk Analysis, Control Risks Group; Global Fellow, Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson Centre for Scholars, UK

Moderator

Julia Berghofer

Policy Fellow, European Leadership Network

19.15 -19.30

Concluding remarks

Minsk Dialogue Virtual Forum-2020 was organised in partnership with:



ABOUT THE MINSK DIALOGUE

The Minsk Dialogue was launched as a Track-2 initiative at the beginning of 2015. Its mission is to offer an open and geopolitically unbiased platform for research and discussions on international affairs and security in Eastern Europe. Regular Minsk Dialogue events gather international experts, as well as high-level officials and diplomats.

The Minsk Dialogue's team and its network of experts produce analytical reports, policy papers, commentaries, backgrounders, and conference non-papers, which are widely distributed among relevant international stakeholders. All analytical publications and conference materials can be accessed at www.minskdialogue.by.

The inaugural Minsk Dialogue Forum took place in May 2018. It gathered about 500 experts and diplomats from 59 countries. In October 2019, more than 700 participants from 63 countries, including high-level officials and leading international experts, took part in the second edition of the Forum.

